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Taxes and Torts in the Redistribution of Income
David A. Weisbach*
When I was asked to give the Coase lecture, it presented somewhat of a puzzle. The
lecture is supposed to introduce a topic in law and economics to first year students. I teach
tax law and generally do not teach first year students. What would I have to say to them?
Notwithstanding that the tax law is virtually never mentioned in first year courses such as
torts, contracts, and property, or more generally in common law jurisprudence, I will argue
that the tax system is actually central to thinking about such topics. The thesis is that the
presence or absence of the tax system completely changes how one thinks about basic
subjects.
The reason why this is so is because the tax system plays a central role in the
redistribution of income or wealth. In thinking about legal rules, we must ask whether they
should be designed to redistribute or whether they should merely be efficient. For example,
we might want to know whether we have pro-tenant landlord/tenant rules on the theory that
tenants are systematically poorer than landlords. Should we have pro-consumer warranty
rules on the theory that consumers are systematically poorer than producers? And should we
have pro-plaintiff nuisance rules?
A common thought might be that legal rules that redistribute income are a good idea
because they help the poor and disadvantaged. Laws of this sort can be viewed as a means of
doing social justice. Law is not some sterile instrument that comes out of a vacuum. Instead,
law is a means of improving our society. A common counter-claim in law and economics is
no, legal rules should not be used to redistribute to the poor. Instead, legal rules should be
efficient. While we see the efficiency claim a lot, it is not always clear what it is based on.
Do law and economics scholars simply not like the idea of redistribution? Are they
uninterested in social justice?
I will argue that legal rules should not be designed to redistribute to the poor, but this
is not out of a lack of concern for distribution or equality. My argument is that there is a
better method of addressing these concerns. In particular, the tax system is a better tool for
redistribution of income than legal rules. We should therefore use the tax system rather than
legal rules to address income inequality and, correspondingly, legal rules should not
systematically favor the poor. Without the tax system, this conclusion would not necessarily

*

Professor, University of Chicago Law School. This paper was delivered as the Coase
Lecture at the University of Chicago Law School on February 19, 2002.
-1-

hold and legal rules might optimally be set to redistribute. Thus, I claim a central place for
the tax system in thinking about legal rules. 1
I will start by discussing redistribution more generally. Many of you will already be
familiar with this initial material but for some of you it might be new and it will probably be
helpful to review it for everyone. Then I will turn to a comparison of legal rules and the tax
system as methods of redistribution.
I.

Redistribution

Why might we want to redistribute income? There are a variety of reasons. For
example, the rich might be altruistic toward the poor so that redistribution helps both.
Alternatively, redistribution might act as a form of social insurance. Any of us could easily
be down and out someday due to misfortune. Redistribution hedges this risk.
The most commonly cited reason for redistribution, and the one I will focus on, is that
individuals have declining marginal utility of income. All this means is that is as individuals
get wealthier, each dollar is less important. One reason why individuals might have
declining marginal utility of income is simply that individuals will tend to satisfy their most
important needs first. Once they have enough income to satisfy these, they move on to lesser
needs. This type of planning or maximization means that the first dollar one receives is more
important than the millionth. Another reason we might believe in declining marginal utility
is just introspection B the extra brass and teak fittings on a gazillionaire=s yacht seem to be
less important to him than food or housing to a pauper.
If individuals have declining marginal utility of income, redistribution can be a good
idea because the loss in utility to the wealthy from whom we take a dollar is not as great as
the gain to the poor, who receives the dollar. If we continued the analysis without thinking
further, we might conclude that significant redistribution is appropriate. In fact, at the
extreme, we would redistribute until everyone had equal incomes. So long as there is
declining marginal utility, it is always a good idea to take from the wealthier and give to the
poorer until all incomes are equal.
The problem is that redistribution is costly. Not only are there the costs of the
administrative apparatus of redistribution B measuring income, collecting the money, etc.
There are costs in terms of incentives. In particular, if we take income from people, then
each hour of work or unit of savings brings less to them. For example, if you previously
earned $10 an hour and we start taking 40% of your income, your take home pay is now $6
per hour. This means that the trade off between working and doing other things B which I

When I use the term Atax system@ I mean it broadly to include the transfer system as
well. We can have government payments to individuals as well as collections.
1
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will call leisure B is changed. Work is relatively less attractive than leisure. As a result, we
can expect people to work less. Why spend those extra hours, for example moonlighting at a
second job, for not much reward?
This distortion, which is generally called a distortion in labor/leisure choice, results in
efficiency losses. The overall size of the pie, including how much there is to redistribute,
goes down because people work less. A metaphor that is frequently used is that
redistribution is a leaky bucket. When we take money away from one person to give to
another, we lose some during the transfer.
What is the size of the distortion? There are, as you might guess, a lot of studies and,
as you might also guess, they produce conflicting results.2 It turns out to be very difficult to
measure. One story is that the distortion is small in part because people tend to work
relatively fixed hours. If your job demands 40 hours per week, you don=t have the choice to
reduce it to 35 hours when tax rates go up.
Another story is that the distortion is large, particularly for various subclasses of
individuals. Our moonlighter has the choice of working the extra hours. Second earners in a
family are also thought to be very responsive to changes in tax rates. And even primary
earners putting in their 40 hours can be responsive to tax rates in a variety of subtle ways,
such as how much they invest in education or training, how hard they work for advancement,
and similar nonhours elements of work. This empirical debate will continue on for the
indefinite future. For our purposes, unless you think the distortion is zero, there will be a
cost to redistribution.
In addition, regardless of the absolute size of the cost initially, it is generally thought
to go up with taxes, so the more we wish to redistribute, the higher the cost. Worse, it is
thought to go up very fast B with the square of the tax rate B so even small distortions can
become very large if tax rates are high enough.
The million dollar question is how we balance these concerns. Redistribution seems
like a good idea but it is costly. How do we decide how much to do? To make this decision,
we need a theory of what is good for society B we need some philosophy. I=m not going to
do philosophy here B I probably couldn=t even if I tried. Instead, I=m going to simply demand
that, whatever answer we get, we make it explicit.
Such an expression of beliefs about this trade off is called a social welfare function. It
tells us how well off a society is based on the welfare of the individuals in that society. This
means it tells us when more redistribution at a given cost is a good idea. I will, for purposes
of our discussion, put two restrictions on the social welfare function.
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First, I will restrict the social welfare function to be a function of the welfare of
individuals. Society is better off when individuals in society are better off. Concepts like
justice can affect social welfare, but they must do so by making individuals better off rather
than by satisfying an abstract ideal. Second, I want the social welfare function to be
consistent with Pareto efficiency. This means that if the welfare of one individual goes up
and the welfare of nobody else goes down, we should think of society as better off.
What are some prominent examples of social welfare functions that meet these
criteria? One of the most prominent is the utilitarian social welfare function. Utilitarians
hold that we can measure how well society is doing by adding up the utilities of the
individuals in society. Each person is weighted equally under this social welfare function.
The philosopher John Rawls proposed a different measure of social welfare known as
the maximin. While not exactly what he said – he was concerned with items other than
individual welfare – a crude version of the maximin is that the welfare of society is measured
by the welfare of the worst off individual in society. Rawls= formulation is generally thought
to be more egalitarian than the utilitarian social welfare function.
We can also come up with intermediate versions, that are more egalitarian than the
utilitarian social welfare function but less so than the maximin. One example is the product
of individuals= welfare. While we can debate the merits of various social welfare functions, I
am not going to concern myself with this choice except to ask that it be explicit and meet the
few minimal conditions I have mentioned.
I should note before moving on that there are many very difficult problems with this
formulation of what makes a good society. For example, we must decide whether to count
hateful preferences in social welfare B if someone is happy when another is injured, do we
count that perverse happiness? We also have to decide who is included. Do we count
foreigners? What about embryos or animals? There is a whole literature devoted to studying
these problems. This is a talk about law and economics, not philosophy, so I will ignore
these problems here. I will assume that we have a social welfare function and get on with the
analysis.
Once we have had our ethical debates and chosen a social welfare function, we can
think fairly clearly about redistribution. It actually becomes a mathematical problem. We
want to maximize social welfare given constraints about the costs of redistribution, and we
can solve for the optimal system.
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The original work along these lines was done by James Mirrlees in 1971, and he was
later awarded the Nobel Prize in part for this work.3 The actual mathematics are very
complex and of little interest to the nonspecialist. It might be helpful, however, to
demonstrate the principles with a simple example because the discussion so far has been
somewhat abstract. An article by Joe Bankman and Tom Griffith has an example that serves
well for our purposes. 4
Suppose we have three individuals in a hypothetical society. (Obviously in a real
society, there are more than three individuals. We can think of the three as three
representative classes of individuals in a more realistic society.) Their wage rates are as
indicated in the table.
Individual

Wage Rate

Alice

$10/hour

Betty

$20/hour

Cindy

$40/hour

I will also assume that they have a utility function that combines both their
consumption and their time off from work, or leisure. In particular, I am going to assume
that their utility is the log of the product of consumption and leisure, or:
Utility = Log [consumption • leisure]
The reason I use the log function is that it goes up but at a declining rate, which gives us
declining marginal utility. I use the product of consumption and leisure so that individuals
will want to balance the two B both count and if either is too low utility will decline. For
example, if the individual is a beachcomber and has only leisure and no consumption, utility
will be low. Similarly, if the individual is a workaholic and has consumption but no leisure,
utility will decline. Our individuals want a mix of free-time and wealth, like most
individuals that I know. Note also that the utility function gives us implicitly the
labor/leisure distortion because it determines how much individuals will reduce work when
they are taxed. It tells us their trade-off between work and leisure.

3
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See Joe Bankman and Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New
Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1905 (1987). This article also has an excellent
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Given this society, we can set a tax rate or rates to raise revenue. I will assume that
we set a single rate on everyone and use the money raised to pay for a public good that
benefits all equally. We can think of this as simply giving them back money B the public
good counts as consumption in their utility functions. This system is progressive because
they pay in based on a percent of income, so Cindy pays more than the others, but they all get
back the same amount. We can do the calculation with more complex tax structures but it
just makes it more complicated without changing the basic ideas.
Given this tax and spending system, we calculate how much each one works and their
utility for any given tax rate. We then plug this into our social welfare function and
determine overall social welfare. The problem is to find the tax rate that maximizes social
welfare.
I won=t bore you with the mathematics of the solution B in this simple example, the
math is fairly straightforward but in more realistic cases the math can be formidable. But
I=ve calculated social welfare for the utilitarian and Rawlsian social welfare functions.
Here is the utilitarian case. On the y-axis we have the sum of utilities. On the x-axis
we have the tax rate. So the graph shows how total social welfare, the sum of utilities, varies
with the tax rate. From examination of the graph, we can see that social welfare is
maximized when the tax rate is approximately 31%.

Here are the income and welfare numbers at the optimum. We can see that even at
the optimum, our sample society is not completely equal B not even close. The wealthiest
individual, Cindy, has more than three times as much income as the poorest and is better of
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in terms of utility as well. Notwithstanding this inequality, further redistribution would be a
mistake because it would reduce total utility.
Optimum with Utilitarian Social Welfare Function
Income

Utility

Alice

$118

7.61

Betty

$201

7.98

Cindy

$366

8.49

Total

$686

24.08

Here is the same society, but using a Rawlsian social welfare function. Note the
change to the graph. Previously we had total utility on the y-axis. Now the y-axis has the
utility of the worst off individual. The optimal tax rate has gone up to somewhere around
60%.

Here are the income and welfare numbers at this optimum. The numbers are more
equal B the best off now has only two and one half times the wealth of the worst off. But
there is still substantial inequality in both income and utility. Cindy is still much better off
than Alice. Note also that total wealth and total utility went down. For example, total wealth
went down from $686 under utilitarianism to $480 under the minimax. We have traded off
these totals for more equality.
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Optimum with Rawlsian Social Welfare Function
Income

Utility

Alice

$96

7.74

Betty

$144

7.86

Cindy

$240

8.19

Total

$480

23.79

Why would a Rawlsian social welfare function leave us with this sort of inequality
when it cares only about the welfare of the poorest? Why wouldn=t it tell us to have more
redistribution? The reason is that we cannot help the worst off any more B raising the tax rate
to transfer more to her actually makes her worse off because the extra taxes she has to pay
and the reduction in the amount we redistribute to her because the efficiency losses from
taxation. The pie shrinks so much, the efficiency losses are so high, that we cannot do any
better.
Is this an artifact of our limited tax structure? We are limiting ourselves to a single
tax rate, so raising Cindy=s taxes also raises Alice=s taxes. It is hard in this structure to take
from Cindy without hurting Alice. The answer, it turns out, is not very much dependent on
our limited model. Even under quite general tax structures there is still substantial inequality
with a Rawlsian social welfare function. The leaky bucket remains very important.
That=s the background. The core idea is that redistribution of income is probably a
good thing. It most likely increases social welfare. Unfortunately, redistribution creates
inefficiencies, such as the distortion in the choice between labor and leisure. Redistribution
is a leaky bucket. Therefore, we have to trade the benefits of redistribution with its
efficiency costs, and we end up with some desirable amount of redistribution that may leave
us far from equal We are now finally ready to discuss the main topic, which is whether legal
rules should be used to redistribute income. I want to compare legal rules to the tax system
as methods of redistributing income.
II.

The Legal System Compared to the Tax System as a Method of Redistributing
Income

Suppose we have a legal rule and a tax system that have similar redistributive effects.
They both, for example, take similar amounts from those with high income and give to those
with low incomes. Which one do we prefer?5
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The argument made here is primarily due to Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Why the
Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. Legal
-8-

Consider a legal rule that redistributes income by varying from the efficient result.
The legal rule redistributes income, which is good. It also creates inefficiencies. Because it
redistributes, it reduces the return from working, and, therefore, it causes labor/leisure
distortions. But, and this is the key fact, it also deviates from the efficient legal rule, so it
causes inefficiencies along that boundary as well. It will cause individuals to take too much
or too little care, breach contracts inappropriately, under or over invest in property, and so on.
The legal rule affects two margins: the decision to work and the decisions relevant to the
legal rule.
Compare that to an income tax. It too causes a labor/leisure distortion. We have the
same disincentives to work. But it does not cause inefficiencies along other margins. It will
not change incentives to take care, incentives to breach, and so forth. This means we can get
the same redistribution at a lower cost. Or we can get more redistribution at the same cost.
But either way, the tax system is a more efficient method of redistributing than the legal rule.

That, in a nutshell, is the main argument. We can develop the intuition further by
stating the argument slightly differently. Suppose we are considering a legal rule that favors
the poor. Say we deviate from efficient tort damages so as to redistribute toward the poor.
The wealthy in this case will expect to pay more or receive less in tort and there is a
corresponding benefit to the poor. Suppose instead we make the legal rule efficient and
adjust the tax system to redistribute the same amount by increasing its progressivity.
By making this adjustment, we have identical distributional consequences. The wealthy pay
more and the poor receive more. There are, therefore, identical benefits from redistribution
and also identical distortions of the labor/leisure choice. But we have increased the
efficiency of the tort system, because now we resort back to efficient tort rules. So we are
better off.
In fact, strong versions of this argument claim we have made a Pareto improvement B
we have redistributed in exactly the same way by using the tax system but increased total
resources because the tort system is more efficient. The argument is consistent with any of
the social welfare functions we might pick, regardless of how egalitarian we might be.
Therefore, we get our conclusion: the income tax is the better instrument for redistribution
and legal rules should, therefore, not be so used.

Studies 667 (1994). For additional discussion, see, Chris Sanchirico, Taxes versus Legal Rules
as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. Legal Studies 797 (2000); Louis
Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal
Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. Legal Studies 821 (2000); and Chris
Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1003 (2001).
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The argument is a comparative argument. We consider equivalent redistribution
accomplished through two different methods, tax and legal rules. The tax system will be a
better method. I think the argument, as it is, is fairly compelling. But we can actually go
further in the comparison. The argument I just made assumed that legal rules were actually
able to redistribute income fairly well and merely argued that the tax system would do better.
But there are separate reasons to believe that the legal system is often an ineffective
instrument for redistributing income at all. These arguments go under the rubrics of
Acontracting around@ and Ahaphazardness.@
The contracting around argument states that attempts to redistribute through legal
rules will often be defeated because prices will adjust to offset the effect of the legal rule.
For example, if we require landlords to make their apartments habitable through an implied
warranty of habitability, landlords will simply raise the rent to cover their costs.
The initial story seems quite intuitive here. We can examine the extent to which
prices change in various markets and therefore when the effects of legal rules get passed on.
Sometimes prices might not rise so legal rules work might seem to work.
When one digs further into this argument, however, it turns out to be very messy and
much less favorable to the use of legal rules for redistributing income than we might have
initially thought. The core problem is that legal rules change the very product under
consideration. For example, a mandated warranty changes the good being sold from simply a
good to a good plus a warranty. Buyers will value the benefit of the warranty, perhaps more
or perhaps less than its cost. The extent to which prices change reflects how much buyers
value the warranty. If they value it highly, we might expect them to agree to pay a lot more
for the product with the warranty. And if they do not value it at all, they may not be willing
to pay more. Therefore, the extent of the price change is misleading. A big price increase
(relative to the cost of the legal rule) might indicate that the legal rule has made buyers better
off, while a small price increase might indicate that the legal rule has made buyers worse off.
The intuition should be completely flipped from what we might have first thought. 6
To make it messier, individuals will value the warranty differently, with some valuing
the benefit of the legal rule more than its cost and others thinking otherwise. When prices
adjust, there will be redistribution among consumers. If our goal was, say, to redistribute
from sellers to purchasers or landlord to tenants, we might instead have mostly redistributed
among purchasers or among tenants. It is not even clear what it means to have pro-tenant or
pro-consumer rules in this case. Sorting out the actual effects becomes very difficult. The
theoretical questions are hard and the empirical questions are probably even more difficult.

6

For a more complete analysis, see, Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal
Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 Stanford L. Rev. 299
(1991). See also, Henry Smith, Ambiguous Quality Changes from Taxes and Legal Rules, 67
Chicago L. Rev. 647 (2000).
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For example, we are not entirely sure whether labor laws help workers as a whole B
they might, for example, help workers who are employed but make finding work more
difficult for those who are unemployed. Similarly, it is not clear that consumer protection
laws help consumers. I don=t want to take a position on this B there is a large literature on
these various rules B some probably help their intended beneficiaries and some probably do
not. The only point is that attempting to redistribute income through legal rules is a
precarious exercise.
The other standard argument against using legal rules is known as the haphazardness
problem. Consider a pro-plaintiff tort rule. We might want such a rule because, say,
plaintiffs are systematically poorer than defendants. The problem with such an approach is
that it is likely to be both under- and over inclusive. It is under inclusive because many poor
individuals are never part of a tort suit so they would not benefit from the rule. Similarly, the
rule is over inclusive because there will inevitably be some rich plaintiffs who benefit.
Once again, like in the contracting around case, the argument gets much more
complex once we get into the details. For example, even if people are never subject to a
lawsuit, they might bargain in the shadow of the law and, therefore, receive benefits or
detriments indirectly. Similarly, in the tort case, insurance prices will be based on expected
damages, so to the extent individuals buy insurance, they are all affected even if they are
never party to a lawsuit.
Before drawing any conclusions about the strength of the contracting-around and
haphazardness arguments, we must compare the legal system to the tax system. The
argument must always be a comparative argument B it does=t help to criticize one method of
redistribution without comparing it to other methods. The tax system might very well be
subject to the same criticisms as the legal system. Prices might adjust to undo the effect of
tax redistribution and the tax system might be over- and under-broad, taxing the wrong
people sometimes and missing the right people other times.
While these criticisms of the tax system are undoubtably true, I tend to think that they
are likely to be less severe in the tax system than in the legal system. The reason is that the
tax system is a dedicated system that can be tailored and designed to minimize these effects.
But there is no a priori or slam-dunk argument that tells us this will happen. We have to do a
detailed institutional comparison. Still, my initial view is that it is extremely unlikely that the
legal system would compare well.
Taking these arguments altogether, the double distortion argument and the problems
with contracting around and haphazardness, I believe the case against using legal rules to
redistribute to the poor becomes almost overwhelming. The tax system is a dedicated system
designed to measure the variables relevant to redistribution and act only on those margins. It
is hard to imagine that legal rules are likely to do a better job.
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One key point to note is that I have not argued that legal rules should be efficient. All
the argument has shown so far is that legal rules should not be used to redistribute income.
But income is not the only source of inequality. Race, gender, disability, or health all might
be sources of inequality in our society. If we value equality of all sorts not just income
equality, we might want to redistribute based on other sources of inequality.
Maybe legal rules should be used to redistribute on other grounds and, therefore,
should not be efficient, even if they should not be used to redistribute income. Here is an
example. Suppose the severely disabled are less well off than others of equal income. Their
costs may be higher, their needs greater, and so on.
An income tax won=t help much here. Income won=t necessarily correspond to
disability. We can even imagine the case where everyone has the same income but differ
along this dimension. Then an income tax would have nothing to do even though there is
inequality in our society.
Legal rules, however, might help. We could adjust the legal rules to favor the
disabled and thereby redistribute away from everyone else and to the disabled. For example,
we could, as we actually do in real life, impose a mandate on employers that they provide
accommodations for the disabled to allow them to work.
Nothing in the argument so far tells us not to do this. The income-tax-only argument
is only about income redistribution. It does not tell us that legal rules should not be adjusted
to favor nonincome sources of inequality. That is, we need to distinguish between an
argument for efficient legal rules, which I have not made, from an argument that legal rules
should not be used to redistribute income.
Note in the disabilities case, legal rules might seem to favor the poor. If the disabled
are systematically poorer than others and legal rules favor the disabled, then legal rules favor
the poor. But this could easily have gone the other way. If the less well off class happens to
be wealthier than others (the idea might be that they are less well off at any given level of
wealth even though they tend to have more wealth) then the adjustment would favor the rich.
Another way to phrase this point is that if we think of the income tax as the best tool for
handling distribution between income classes, we should think of other types of
redistribution as working within an income class. Accommodation mandates for the disabled
can be thought of as redistributing between individuals with the same income but with and
without disabilities.
While the arguments I have made so far only concerned income and left room for this
type of redistribution, we should not jump to the conclusion that legal rules are a good
method of redistributing on this basis. The arguments about income redistribution might
very well translate to redistribution on other bases.
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For example, much has been written about whether rules that appear to help a given
class, such as the disabled, really do B this is the contracting around argument. There is
literature indicating that the disabilities law helped the disabled who already had jobs but hurt
those who are seeking jobs. This means that it might primarily redistribute within the class
of disabled rather than from the healthy to the disabled.
Haphazardness is also a serious problem B the disabilities law seems to be both over
broad and too narrow. It might apply to individuals who are not really worse off because of
their disabilities and does not apply to the seriously disabled who are completely unable to
work.
Finally, a version of the double distortion argument also might translate to this case.
Suppose we compare a direct redistribution of money to the disabled with a modification to
legal rules to help the disabled. Direct redistribution would have the same redistributive
benefits and costs but would not skew employment relationships. Legal rules skew
employment relationships. Thus, direct redistribution may be superior to legal rules.
I don=t want to condemn the various disabilities laws without serious and focused
analysis of those rules. There may be much to be said for them. There are really only two
points I am trying to make. First, the analysis about whether legal rules should favor the
poor leaves room for this sort of redistribution. The primary argument I have made is not an
argument for efficiency. It is an argument against using legal rules to redistribute income.
But second, the analysis about whether legal rules should favor the poor suggests parallel
analysis for whether legal rules should redistribute on other bases that should make us very
leery of such redistribution. There are good reasons to think that legal rules should be
efficient and not redistribute at all.
That is the basic argument. Let me mention three potential counter arguments. First,
a common criticism of the arguments I have made is that adjustments to the tax system are
not feasible. Just because we identify a social problem, say inadequate housing, doesn=t
mean that the tax system will be adjusted to resolve it.
This argument is correct to some extent. If the tax system is unavailable, we would
want to resort to the next best alternative. If our only alternative is legal rules, we may want
to use them. But there is no particular reason to believe that legal rules will be more
available than taxes. The tax system is adjusted all the time B it is famous for constantly
changing. Moreover, the extent of redistribution is a constant topic of discussion, so much so
that many observers complain that it dominates discussion to the exclusion of other
considerations. Think how much you have heard about whether the Bush tax cuts help the
rich too much.
Moreover, if some political coalition would block additional redistribution through
the tax system, there is no reason to believe it would not block the same redistribution when
-13-

done indirectly through legal rules. It might fight even harder against legal rules because of
the additional costs imposed by the inefficiencies.
Maybe using legal rules gets around these coalition problems because courts can
make decisions about redistribution using legal rules, and courts are largely outside the
political process. But one needs a complex view of the appropriate roles of courts and
legislatures to argue that if redistribution cannot be passed through the democratic process
that it should occur in a more expensive manner through courts.
The feasibility intuition is very strong among lawyers. I=m not sure exactly why B
perhaps because lawyers are focused on legal rules so they consider them more malleable
than the tax system. Perhaps it is because lawyers tend to see what looks like an immediate
injustice in a given case without thinking systematically about the problem. On close
examination, it has little force.
Second, the tax system is a mess. While using legal rules has problems, the tax
system is riven with loopholes, it is costly to administer, and it is byzantine in its complexity.
It is not the efficient and sleek method of redistribution portrayed so far. How can I defend
such a monstrosity?
I don=t intend to defend the income tax from these attacks. I make them myself all the
time. But there is no reason to believe that other broad-based redistributive systems would
be any better along these grounds and they could easily be much worse. All the problems
that lead to loopholes and complexity in the income tax would pervade any alternative
attempt to measure and redistribute income.
A final point is that people might respond differently to redistribution through the tax
system than through legal rules. 7 For example, people might notice the redistribution through
the legal rules less and, therefore, redistribution through legal rules might distort work
incentives less. To make this slightly more formal, suppose that legal rules apply only
infrequently, so that there is a low probability of them applying. A common claim about
humans is that they underestimate infrequent events. If this is true in this case, people may
systematically underestimate the redistribution through legal rules and, therefore, not adjust
their labor/leisure choice.
We can=t know the truth of this claim without more investigation. I have been
assuming that people respond to real incentives, that there are no systematic, longstanding
illusions. If there are such illusions, there might be many opportunities to take advantage of
them, not just with respect to redistribution. I would think, however, that to the extent there
is any significant redistribution, it would be difficult to retain illusions of this sort.

7

See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules,
51 Vand. L. Rev. 1653 (1998).
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In addition, if insurance is available so that the legal rule applies through insurance
prices, it is much more difficult to tell a story that involves systematic bias. And if we are
relying on lack of insurance, so that legal rules apply only probabilistically, haphazardness
becomes a serious problem. Therefore, I do not think arguments of this sort get us very far.
III.

Conclusion

My conclusion is quite simple: legal rules should not be used to redistribute income.
Let me give a slightly softer conclusion as well. Even if one rejects some of the particulars
of the argument B and you should know that there is literature that does8 B the central place of
the tax system in thinking about the appropriate goals for legal rules cannot be denied. That
is, even if there is some scope for redistribution of income through legal rules in certain
contexts, the existence of the tax system very much narrows it. We would have to think
completely differently about legal rules if we did not have the tax system or other broadbased redistributive systems.

8

See, e.g., Sanchirico, note 5.
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